Some competent political actors, primarily young people and the cognitively impaired, are excluded from political participation by modern liberal democratic states. This exclusion occurs because the means utilised by states to distinguish between competent citizens (who must be included) and incompetent ones (who may be excluded) are imperfect. They include age restrictions on enfranchisement and, commonly, legal restrictions on enfranchisement for those with cognitive disabilities. Capacity testing provides a means to improve on these existing mechanisms for exclusion. It is not, however, often suggested, nor seen as viable. Here, I argue that we should utilise capacity testing to more effectively include capable citizens in our democratic practice. I defend a particular scope and kind of capacity testing against common objections.
Introduction
There is ongoing debate as to who ought to be included in the franchise, and on which grounds people can be excluded from the franchise. The answers to questions of this kind, it is increasingly clear, are as follows: Every citizen capable of democratic participation ought to be included in the franchise, and it is only on grounds of incapacity that anyone may legitimately be excluded. 1 This answer leaves us with further questions. Firstly, what is the capacity standard? That is, do we have a good system for informing us who is capable of democratic participation? Secondly, how can we apply this system such that all and only the incapable are excluded from political participation? This can, of course, be reformulated to ask how to apply a system such that it includes all and only the capable. In this article, I am concerned primarily with answering this second question. 2 I argue that we have and should utilise a test for political capacity in order to increase the extent to which we enfranchise capable citizens within our democracies. To make this case, I must first provide a prima facie case for the necessity for capacity testing. I then outline the features of the type of capacity testing I envisage, and provide evidence of the existence and use of this test to demonstrate its suitability for the task at hand. Having done this, I defend both this test in particular, and the appropriateness of capacity testing more generally against a series of standard objections to capacity testing. The reasons why states and theorists are Larry Cunningham claims that we tie voting to age specifically because of the lack of capacity in minors, 4 while Robert Dahl dismisses out of hand the idea that young children (his example is of an eight year old) could be "enlightened" enough to "participate equally with adults in deciding on laws to be enforced by the government of the state." 5 Jason
Brennan is even more forward, stating that " [a] ll modern democracies exclude children from voting and holding office, on the ground that children are incompetent." 6 So, in most democratic states, those under the age of eighteen are presumed incapable of political participation. 7 Age is not the only signifier of incapacity, although it is the most widespread. 8 Most democratic states also claim the power to disenfranchise at least some people with cognitive disabilities from voting on grounds of incapacity. In Australia, for example, the
Commonwealth Electoral Act provides that any person who "by reason of being of unsound mind, is incapable of understanding the nature and significance of voting" is unable either to be registered on electoral rolls, or to vote. 9 There are a range of broadly similar laws in various states of the United States of America. 10 Of the democracies studied by Massicote, Blais & Yoshinaka in Establishing the Rules of the Game, only four countries, Canada, Ireland, Italy and Sweden, did not impose any requirement for cognitive ability on potential voters.
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For there to be a prima facie case for capacity testing, I need only show that the above disqualifications, as implemented, sometimes act to disenfranchise capable citizens, and to suggest that capacity testing offers a way to correct this disenfranchisement. With regard to the exclusion of young people, the fact that the current standard sometimes excludes capable actors from participation is often accepted even by proponents of this standard. No one in fact argues that the minimum voting age of eighteen correctly distinguishes in all cases between the capable and the incapable. Rather, the age of eighteen (and minimum voting ages of all kinds) is defended as being a sufficiently accurate approximation to the ideal that suffices to show that the general application of blanket disenfranchisement provisions in fact, as well as theory, serves to disenfranchise some capable citizens. Given this, we have motivation to re-examine the practice of capacity testing, as it provides an opportunity to right some of these injustices.
A capacity testing regime
Before we are able to establish a capacity testing regime, we need a clear understanding of what political capacity entails, and whether it differs from other relevant kinds of capacity. I
propose that someone is politically capable who understands the nature and effect of voting, and has the ability to make a choice. This is the formulation used in the Doe capacity standard. 21 It parallels both the need in medical decision-making situations for an individual to understand the situation and potential consequences of their choice, 22 and the test for criminal capacity in minors. 23 I have defended this categorisation in previous publications.
24
The Doe test I defend here provides a standard for capacity which is consistent with medical and criminal capacity standards, is objective, and is easy to administer. 25 I do not propose to replace our existing systems of enfranchisement with a capacity testing regime. Rather, I
wish here simply to explore the possibility that there is a particular kind of capacity testing system that would be an acceptable component of a well-functioning democratic system. I make the positive account in this section, and examine the standard objections to capacity testing in section five. There are two primary ways of articulating the requirements for democratic citizenry. These are ideal and minimalist accounts. Ideal accounts of democratic competence or capacity look for the features that we desire democratic participants to have, and argue that it is on the basis of these features that we can choose to enfranchise citizens. Minimal accounts, by contrast, argue that we must look only for the threshold requirements, and that any attempt to distinguish between citizens who each satisfy a minimal threshold requirement of capacity is illegitimate. In the remainder of this article I will assume that minimal accounts are the appropriate ones to use. There are two primary reasons for this. Firstly, I take it that no capacity testing regime set up to test for an ideal democratic citizen would be able to avoid the four objections in section five. Secondly, ideal theories do not accord with certain (uncontroversial) features of democratic practice. Perhaps most importantly, democracies do not ask citizens to explain the grounds upon which they have formulated their beliefs. In practice, the procedures of the modern liberal democratic state are neutral between the following democratic actors (and all others): (1) A citizen who has carefully analysed the likely results of particular electoral outcomes, cross-referenced those results to their personal situation, and determined the best possible results for them and those they care about, then voted accordingly; (2) A citizen who is devoutly religious, and has been told by the leader of their local congregation that it is the will of their deity that some particular political party be voted into office; (3) A citizen who feels unenthused by all available choices and determines to complete their ballot according to chance. While we may have good reason to prefer a system in which citizens act as does (1) above, we do not take it to be appropriate to exclude those who act as (2) or (3). This holds for all citizens included by current democratic practice.
There are no grounds upon which we could begin to make this distinction between the citizens included by a test such as the one I am envisaging, and the citizens currently included.
One standard must apply to all.
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What, then, is that standard, and do we have any likely candidate systems that will satisfy it?
The standard I take to be the basis for political capacity is that each enfranchised voter must, in order to have capacity for political participation, understand the nature of voting, the effect of voting and have the ability to make choices between options. This basis for capacity accords with the disenfranchisement provisions common amongst those states which exclude some cognitively impaired individuals from voting, and the analogous tests for decisionmaking capacity in other fields, such as the ability to consent to medical treatment, and liability for prosecution for criminal behaviour.
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The Australian federal standard for disenfranchisement on grounds of cognitive impairment is that any person who, "by reason of being of unsound mind, is incapable of understanding the nature and significance of voting" is not entitled to register or to vote. 29 We see the "nature" requirement arise here again, and the significance mentioned plays the role of "effect" in my proposed system. Similar provisions hold in other jurisdictions. The state of
Wisconsin provides that if the individual "is incapable of understanding the objective of the elective process" they can have their right to vote removed. 30 Similarly, "idiots" and the 35 In the judgement, the court identified the core requirements for political capacity, namely, knowledge of the nature and purpose of voting, and the ability to make a choice. If an individual satisfied these requirements, the court argued that they had sufficient capacity to participate.
The standard developed in Doe v Rowe provides the basis of the test for participatory capacity. It is only if people "lack the capacity to understand the nature and effect of voting such that they cannot make an individual choice" 36 that they may legitimately be excluded.
This standard has since been embodied in question format and used in psychiatric studies of Alzheimer's patients and of people with serious mental illnesses more generally.
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answer some simple questions regarding the purpose and nature of voting, then one has sufficient knowledge of the system to be able to participate. These studies conclude that the capacity to vote can be measured simply and reliably. The test features three simple questions, the first of which, designed to test the subjects understanding of the nature of voting, asks "What will the people of [fill in name: your state] do today to pick the next Governor?" Two points are given for a correct response, such as answering that people will go to the polls and vote; one point for a partially correct response such as pointing out the importance of election day; zero for displaying no understanding, through for example expressing the belief that it is decided by the television presenters covering the election. 38 A score of four or more points over three questions, each of which follows the marking framework described above (correct/partial/no understanding), is taken to indicate a sufficient capacity for participation in democratic processes. The other two questions in the test examine understanding of the effect of voting (how the winner will be decided), and the ability to make a choice (by describing two positions and asking the test subject to pick one). The test itself features additional questions using the same scoring system, but only the three mentioned above are strictly required for the Doe voting capacity standard. 39 If it is accepted that the standard for capacity is uniform across the citizens of a state, such that a single capacity standard can be used in determining whether a person can legitimately be excluded from voting, irrespective of the reason for capacity being called into question,
then the above outlined test should be applicable not only to the cognitively impaired, but to all currently excluded citizens. If the above test suffices to provide proof of capacity for a cognitively disabled person, the same test when passed provides proof of capacity for a young person. Similarly, once capacity is proven, there is no remaining justification for continued exclusion. A lack of capacity is the basis for both restrictions on enfranchisement of the cognitively impaired, and for the blanket exclusion of children and young people from the franchise.
My proposal for capacity testing may then be summarised as follows. We should retain the current practice of automatic inclusion for everyone above a set age. While I have not discussed the details of this here, I believe this should be set significantly lower than the current norm of eighteen; perhaps fourteen, although sixteen is more politically feasible in the current climate. 40 No one above the age limit may be compelled to undertake the proposed capacity test without independent concern having been raised about their capacity for political participation. That is, the presumption of capacity will remain for those over the revised age limit, and the circumstances in which that presumption is questioned will be unchanged. For those excluded by the age limit, or who have in the past been excluded on grounds of incapacity, an optional capacity test is to be made available, with the content described above. Passing this test entitles them to participate, overriding the prior determination of incapacity, or the age-based presumption of incapacity. The questions outlined above constitute the entirety of this standard, the Doe voting capacity standard. 41 I envisage the testing regime being primarily of value to currently excluded children and young people, as they make up an overwhelming majority of the citizens excluded from participation under the status quo. testing introduces the possibility that one will never be involved in democracy. 43 I will address each of these objections in turn, arguing that a capacity testing regime needs not to run afoul of any of them.
Expensive and cumbersome
The objection that capacity testing is necessarily expensive and cumbersome arises from the idea that there will be considerable expense involved in developing an accurate test of participatory capacity, and further, that as any individual may vary in capacity over the years, testing will have to be done on an ongoing basis. Accordingly, it is claimed, much work will be entailed in ensuring that only the currently proven capable are allowed to participate.
The first aspect of this objection is the idea that developing a capacity test will itself involve considerable expense. However, as I have outlined above, there are already effective tests being developed and experimented with, and at least one of these (the model arising from the or have demonstrated capacity through the testing regime. This presumption provides immunity from requirements to re-sit. The worry about the cumbersome nature of the testing can also be alleviated, if we are willing to accept that the simple three part test, very minimal in nature, described above is sufficient to prove capacity.
Corruption, exploitation and the abuse of power
The second objection relies on the possibility of corruption, exploitation and the abuse of power, by those charged with the provision or administration of the testing, or those who develop the tests. This concern is clearly reasonable when capacity testing is suggested as the sole means of inclusion in the franchise. Consider the position of any historically disadvantaged minority group within a democratic system. Social disadvantages including discrimination continue for such groups long after formal equality is achieved, and capacity tests are thereby likely to disadvantage members of these groups, as those in positions of power are disproportionately likely both not to be members of the minority, and to be disposed against their interests. Worries of this sort also motivate the strict constitutional scrutiny applied in the US to capacity testing. Prior attempts to implement it have consistently been biased against African Americans. 46 This objection, as with all those addressed at capacity testing generally, is significantly less concerning when addressing the type of capacity test I envisage here; optional, minimal, and without bearing on the ability of any person tested to be included in democratic activities in the long term. This objection also seems to misapprehend the difference between testing for the minimal capacity required for participation, and testing to determine who is a good democratic citizen, or an approximation of the ideal democratic citizen. As the test envisaged here does the former, it has certain characteristics that minimise the risks of corruption, exploitation and the abuse of power.
A consistent application of a capacity standard for participation requires that a test that suffices to show capacity for participation amongst any group of the currently excluded, such as for example cognitively disabled persons, is also sufficient to show capacity for participation amongst other excluded groups such as the youth. We have examples of such tests for cognitively disabled persons. They test on a pass or fail basis for a set of capacities that ensures only the ability to understand the nature and importance of democratic participation, rather than to ideally, or even successfully, parse the information presented and act so as to maximise personal benefit. This simplistic nature has two effects for the argument here. The first is that given the extensive enfranchisement that characterises the modern democratic state, the inclusion of an incapable person through malicious interference in the system is not going to have a significant impact on the functioning of the democracy. The weight of individual votes (or opinions) is minimal, the value of the franchise lies in the recognition as a relevantly equal political actor, not in the exercise of the powers thereby granted. The second is that the capacity test is not an appealing process to corrupt, as those people who pass gain few opportunities to vote before they are automatically included, and the outcome of decisions is unlikely to be affected by such unwarranted inclusion.
Furthermore, in maintaining under the proposed capacity testing regime the automatic enfranchisement of those over the threshold age, we are already tacitly accepting the inclusion of some incapable persons as voting agents. This is due to the second consequence of an age threshold, its indifference to the actual capacity of those who have passed it. This consideration reduces the concern we need to have for any corrupt influence that may occur.
In conjunction with the prior considerations, which show that there is little incentive for corruption in this process, we can see that these aspects of this objection provide no reason to avoid this type of capacity testing.
As the capacity testing discussed here is supplementary, nothing in this suggestion allows for the exclusion of any person above the age of majority who is incapable of passing the competence test. As Carl Cohen argues, "the many, stupid, foolish citizens must have their right to vote protected." 47 Further, enfranchisement is not a rare good. It is more widespread in modern democracies than it has ever been, and this proposal if implemented will spread it further. Enfranchisement lacks the exclusivity to make privileged access to it enticing. This supplementary nature also provides a distinction between the capacity testing system I envisage, and the historical attempts to institute capacity testing in jurisdictions like the US.
As interpreted by the US Supreme Court in Harper v Virginia Board of Elections, the equal protection clause of the 14 th Amendment to the US constitution requires strict scrutiny of laws that grant the right to vote to some citizens but not to others. Capacity testing does this due to the exclusion of those who fail the test. 48 Demian Ordway claims that "the traditional presumption of constitutionality afforded government action for which there exists a 'rational basis' does not apply to restrictions on the exercise of the franchise…". 49 Nicholas Brescia similarly notes that "any qualification or condition imposed on [mentally disabled] individuals' right to vote must pass a strict scrutiny constitutional analysis and comport with federal law." 50 The proposed system specifically excludes any mechanism through which a citizen can be disenfranchised as a result of the testing, and is thus distinct from the intended target of existing US court decisions.
A possible aspect of this objection that remains plausible even against a minimal capacity testing proposal is that there are particular groups within society who could benefit from a scheme like this by using it to their advantage. The fear echoes the early days of the present US system, when literacy tests were implemented in various states that disproportionately targeted the African American minority and thereby protected the interests of the traditionally powerful citizens. 51 Any capacity testing, it is claimed, generates this opportunity for bias.
As an example, consider the common practice of private schools specifically training children to pass university entrance examinations, giving these children a significant advantage over those attending many public schools. Where a capacity test is implemented, the worry is that groups within society, perhaps the rich, or perhaps the overtly religious, will train children and young people to pass this test as a means of inflating the number of democratic participants with a particular viewpoint. While this seems a legitimate possibility, I do not take it to be a problem for the proposal. Exclusion from the franchise is justified based solely on a lack of capacity for participation. If any person demonstrates the capacity required to participate, the means by which they acquired that ability are irrelevant. As such, there is a morally relevant asymmetry here. Excluding the incapable generates no rights breaches as the right to vote is in fact dependent on it being possible for the individual concerned to exercise it. However, excluding a capable citizen from voting out of concern for how they will participate, or how they came to be capable, is equivalent to the further introduction of a test of moral soundness, one that is designed to exclude competent political actors. Such an action breaches their rights. We should then err towards inclusion. 52 Additionally I do not take this objection to have a very wide scope. The proposed test has no bearing on the inclusion of anyone beyond the age of voting majority and the capacity being tested for is a minimal one, so the number of persons who could be advantaged in this way is small. If it is nevertheless concerning, schools or other institutions could be compelled to offer training classes to anyone wishing to take the test. An exclusive test, one which relies on a particular conception of moral soundness, is not only morally reprehensible, but runs afoul of all the same objections that we are in the process of discussing, and as its purpose is exclusion, it has much more difficulty responding satisfactorily to them than does the type of test I am defending.
Lack of objective agreement
The objection that there is no objective agreement over the determination of capacity, how it may be done, and whether differing cultural perspectives need to be considered in making such a determination is also overstated with respect to a minimal capacity test. As discussed in setting out the framework of capacity testing, there is increasing agreement regarding the level of competence required for democratic participation, and this level is minimal. The same applies to concerns regarding the grading of responses. That leaves the charge of bias as the overwhelming concern arising from this objection.
Against the charge of bias, one must consider that to the extent that an understanding of the nature and requirements of democratic participation is culturally specific, requiring either a liberal democratic environment or teaching in the procedures used in such an environment, this bias is acceptable. It only differentiates on the basis of knowledge that is required for effective participation, and makes no judgment on the type of reasoning or decision-making procedures any individual will utilise when participating within a democratic framework.
The capacity test as outlined in this article does not, for example, differentiate against those who vote as they are told to by their community or religious leaders, so long as they understand that it is a tallying of votes that produces the outcome, and accept the role of elected officials in the state. An extensive capacity test, that attempted to select only the "good" democratic citizens as being legitimate participants in democracy, would run afoul of this objection, as once one moves beyond a determination of basic capacity and begins to examine what makes participation better, certain cultural characteristics rapidly become privileged.
Permanent exclusion
Archard's final objection relies on the possibility of permanent exclusion from the franchise.
He argues that by contrast to age, which provides stable expectations of inclusion (everyone is enfranchised upon reaching the threshold age requirement), capacity testing introduces the possibility that one will never be involved in democracy. That is, for those people who are incapable of passing the capacity test, inclusion in the franchise will always be denied. Were this objection accurate, it would perhaps be the most damning of them all. While the others could be mitigated by manipulating the capacity testing system, this objection points out that the results of the system may themselves be unacceptable.
My proposed system does not create the possibility of permanent disenfranchisement. Rather, I suggest that some limited forms of capacity testing may be justifiable, and that these forms should be used as a supplement to existing systems of disenfranchisement such as the age threshold and the exclusion of certain classes of the cognitively impaired.
The capacity test envisaged here is an enabling mechanism, allowing those under the age of majority who desire to vote to prove that they are capable of doing so, and thereby to gain early inclusion in the franchise. The age standard under such a system remains in place and continues to function as it does presently, providing participatory rights to all those who pass it. While this raises the possibility of over-inclusiveness, I leave this issue for another time.
Where capacity testing is supplementary to a voting age, it simply provides the option of early entry into the voting ranks for those who can demonstrate capacity, without affecting the inclusion of the general population automatically upon coming of age. The reasons for this lie in the positive case I make above, namely that existing methods of exclusion from the franchise, both for the cognitively impaired and for the young, are too coarse grained to effectively differentiate between the actually incapable and those for whom participation is 22 simply more difficult. If it is the case that existing methods of disenfranchisement misidentify some capable persons as non-capable, and if it is the case that a capacity testing system can remedy this misidentification, then we have reason to consider implementing it.
So, while this objection presumes that the purpose of capacity testing is to exclude citizens from participation, the test here envisaged is inclusive, or enabling. It is intended to allow those currently excluded to prove that they are capable of participation, and thereby to gain inclusion in the franchise. The testing regime will neither replace the age threshold, following which citizens are presumed capable and automatically included, nor will it subject citizens to testing indiscriminately. It is designed to provide a way for the currently excluded to prove they are capable of inclusion, not to eliminate any included persons from consideration.
Benefits of capacity testing
The judicious use of capacity testing, under the circumstances outlined above, therefore provides democratic states with a better approximation of the goal of including all capable citizens in formal democratic procedures such as voting than does the status quo. The practical argument for the current model of exclusion from the franchise relies on untenable premises. The blanket provisions which prevent those under eighteen and those deemed cognitively incapable from participating, do not sufficiently accurately identify the features of these people which would justify their exclusion. Further, we have, as demonstrated here, a system available that allows us to identify at a much finer grained level those who are in fact capable of participation, and thereafter to include them.
If implemented with the current age limit, this system would include an electorally significant number of people. If, however, it was implemented in conjunction with a lowering of the voting age, there would be a comparatively small impact on political outcomes. Even in that case, the proposal would have practical benefits. This system helps for example to overcome the worry that our current system has a "legitimacy deficit" -there are citizens with a valid claim to political inclusion, who we currently exclude out of expediency. While having an age limit and automatic inclusion upon reaching the age is simple, having a capacity test, usable to include those excluded by the simple system, is better as a matter of institutional structure. It overcomes the legitimacy deficit, and while not as simple as the current system, does a better job of capturing the actual capacity of the citizens concerned.
This test is not proposed as a cure-all for our existing democratic systems. I do not, for example, propose any method by which we can ensure that those presumed capable of participation are in fact so capable. As such, we continue to run the risk of wrongly including people who will not (because they cannot) vote with the requisite intentions. The standard of minimal competence to which I have appealed throughout this article should, however, significantly reduce the number of people who are eligible for such exclusion. Further, nothing in what I have argued for could restrict the ability of competent actors to act incompetently, should they so desire. These risks continue to be associated with our democratic institutions. What the implementation of this test will do, is remove one currently existing and substantial source of injustice in modern liberal democratic states. It will help these states to enfranchise all capable citizens.
Conclusion
All modern liberal democratic states share a commitment to political inclusiveness, as evidenced by the steady expansion of the franchise in these states, and the corresponding decrease in the number and scope of disqualifying factors taken to justify the political exclusion of citizens. This practical commitment to inclusiveness reflects a coalescing theoretical consensus regarding political participation, that the institutions of democratic states should be broadly inclusive, with limits on inclusion arising only out of necessity, as is the case when a person is in fact incapable of political participation. 53 This commitment and consensus have significantly increased entitlements to participation amongst citizens. However, members of some particular groups within democratic states remain excluded, and it is not clear that this exclusion is always consonant with the ideals of inclusiveness outlined above. For many young people, excluded through strict age limits on participation, and for many cognitively impaired people, excluded through blanket statutory or constitutional provisions, our democracies are failing to include them, despite their being capable of participation. I have argued here that capacity for political participation is in fact a minimal standard; a standard which is satisfied by at least some young people, and at least some of the cognitively impaired. I have also described an existing test for political capacity which suffices to identify those citizens who are capable but excluded, and argued that this test provides us with an opportunity to right the injustice currently prevalent amongst democratic states. While this test was designed and has been used to identify the capable amongst the cognitively impaired that have been excluded from participation, capacity for political participation is a consistent standard across all citizens. If the characteristics and abilities identified by the test suffice to show capacity for any citizen who takes it, they similarly suffice to show capacity for all other citizens who display the same characteristics or abilities when tested.
However, capacity testing has a tawdry past, and is commonly held to be intrinsically harmful.
As such, in addition to identifying the problem above as one which capacity testing can solve, I had also to defend the very idea of capacity testing against those who see any implementation of a testing regime as bringing with it an array of harms. To this end, I
identified the major weaknesses of the idea of capacity testing, and argued that the aforementioned test is immune to each of them. In virtue of its central features, being 25 minimal, inclusive, voluntary and sortal, I argued that this test offers a solution to the problem of harmful exclusion from political participation, while not being subject to the standard concerns regarding expense, the cumbersome nature of testing regimes, openness to corruption, exploitation or the abuse of power, the lack of objective agreement about capacity, or the risk of permanent exclusion.
We have good reasons not to replace our current, inclusive systems with a system dependent on capacity testing for the inclusion of any citizen as a participant in the formal procedures of democracy. However, as I have argued here, there are other spaces within our current democratic practice where capacity testing could be utilised. Primarily, capacity testing as a supplement to our existing system of widespread inclusion benefits the members of currently marginalised groups such as young people and the cognitively impaired, while not harming the interests of those included under the present system. Implementing this capacity testing regime would help to align our democratic practices more closely with what our theories of political inclusion tell us to seek.
